The purpose of this essay la to develop an appraisal of North Norway in order to determine the order of significance which should be attached to it in developing NATO strategy. Intormation was gathered from a literature search and from visits to the area while the author was assigned to the staff of Allied Command Northern Europe. While lacking vital intrinsic value, North Norway provides NATO with a base for forward surveillance and operations. It would be especially valuable for operations to block the sea routes between the Atlantic and the Soviet naval base complex in the Murmansk area. In addition, the credibility of NATO's collective security assurances would be seriously damaged if any NATO territory were occupied. The Soviet forces in the border area far outnumber the Norwegian forces and have the capability of rapidly isolating the area. The Norwegian decision not to base NATO troops and nuclear weapons in Norway contribute to its vulnerability. The essay concludes that Norway should continue to maintain screening forces to resist possible Soviet incursions and that NATO should maintain sufficient reserve forces which could be deployed as an alternative to a nuclear response.
The effectiveness of equipment was greatly reduced and primary reliance was placed on men who were trained and experienced in Arctic operations. Mobility was low and momentum was difficult to maintain. Since roads were difficult to build, those few that were in existence were critical to operations.
The control of other areas was relatively unimportant. The Germans found that there was no season that favored offensive operations. The weather and terrain always created problems.
Mobility was generally better during the winter when the ground war. covered by snow and ice. However, that advantage was 27 Ibid., p. 5. 28 Ibld., pp. 317-320. 29 Ibid., p. 111. 
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■ sunk. Convoy operations were suspended for a period of two months after the attack. Thereafter, the German forces were never again that large, nor were the attacks so successful.^ Throughout the war, however, the Germans demonstrated the threat to sea movements to and from the Soviet northern ports of having North Norway occupied by a hostile power. 
